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 Holding that the widespread effects of environmental regulation 
on the coal industry constituted sufficient importance, the Northern 
District of West Virginia ordered the Environmental Protection Agency 
to conduct analysis on employment loss and plant reduction resulting 
from regulatory effects. In admonishing the EPA’s inaction, the court 
ruled that the Agency had a non-discretionary duty to evaluate 
employment and plant reduction. Furthermore, the court held that the 
EPA’s attempt to put forth general reports in place of required 
evaluations was an invalid attempt to circumvent its statutory duty.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Murray Energy Corp. v. McCarthy, the Murray Energy 
Corporation along with its subsidiary companies (collectively 
“Murray”) challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) 
failure to evaluate potential shifts or loss in the coal industry’s 
employment resulting from enforcement of the Clean Air Act (“Act”).1 
Murray claimed under § 321 of the Act, the EPA has a non-
discretionary duty to evaluate and investigate employment reduction 
and threatened plant closures resulting from the Act’s enforcement.2 
Murray further argued the Act’s effects and the EPA’s failure to 
evaluate the impact of those effects on the coal industry and its 
employees irreparably harmed Murray.3 Holding that the EPA had a 
non-discretionary duty to evaluate employment loss and threatened 
plant closures, the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of West Virginia denied the EPA’s Motion to Dismiss.4 After 
significant proceedings, the EPA then filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment.5 Determining Summary Judgment inappropriate, the court 
held the EPA had a non-discretionary duty under § 321(a) of the Act 
and ordered it to fully comply with the requirement to evaluate the 
effects of the Act on the coal industry.6 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1.  Murray Energy Corp. v. McCarthy, No. 5:14-CV-39, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 143404, 2015 WL 7017009 (N.D. W. Va. Oct. 17, 2016). 
2.  Id. at *3 (section 321(a) of the Clean Air Act is codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 7621(a) (2012)). 
3.  Id. at *3.  
4.  Id. at *83.  
5.  Id. at *5, *6, *9.  
6.  Id. at *83. 
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The risk of economic depression affecting communities and 
workers was a significant congressional concern during the passage of 
environmental statutes, including the Act.7 In 1977, Congress amended 
the Act to include a provision requiring the EPA to complete an ongoing 
evaluation of employment loss resulting from implementation of the 
Act’s requirements.8 The evaluation requirement included undertaking 
investigations of employment reductions or potential and actual plant 
closures.9  
 As “the largest underground coal mining operation in the United 
States,” Murray argued that its financial livelihood depends on an active 
coal market.10 Murray claimed that in the past five years, the EPA has 
waged war on coal by using the Act to promote other energy sources and 
incentivize a reduction in coal consumption.11 Murray further alleged if 
the EPA evaluated the potential and actual plant closures occurring in the 
United States, combined with their resulting unemployment, the EPA’s 
harmful policy practices would be exposed and necessitate 
reevaluation.12  
 Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for the EPA’s apparent 
refusal to conduct employment loss and plant closure evaluations, 
Murray filed its initial complaint against the EPA.13 The EPA filed a 
motion to dismiss the complaint asserting the court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction.14 The court denied the Motion and found that the court had 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case and that the EPA had a non-
discretionary duty to evaluate employment loss and plant closures.15 
Numerous procedural motions on behalf of the EPA followed 
culminating in a motion for summary judgment.16 
 In an effort to dismiss the case, the EPA sought Summary 
Judgment on three grounds.17 First, the EPA asked the court to reevaluate 
its finding that § 321(a) of the Act places a non-discretionary duty on the 
EPA.18 Second, the EPA reasserted its previous argument that Murray 
lacked Article III standing.19 Third, the EPA maintained it was in full 
compliance with § 321(a)’s requirements.20 In a lengthy opinion, the 
                                                     
7.  Id. at *48–*51. 
8. Id. at *55 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 317 (1977)).  
9.  Id.  
10.  Id. at *28.  
 11. Pls.’ Compl. 7 (Mar. 24, 2014) No. 5:14-cv-39.  
12.  Murray Energy Corp., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143404, at *28. 
13.  Id. at *2–*3.  
14.  Id. at *3–*4. 
15.  Id. at *4.  
16.  Id. at *4–*9.  
17.  Id. at *11.  
18.  Id.  
19.  Id. at *11–*12. 
20.  Id. at *12. 
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court addressed each of the EPA’s assertions and denied its Motion for 
Summary Judgment.  
III. ANALYSIS 
 
 The District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia 
reviewed the EPA’s Motion for Summary Judgment by first discussing 
the legal standard for Summary Judgment as governed by Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 56.21 The court then examined each of the three 
grounds asserted by the EPA.22  
 
A. Clean Air Act § 321(a) Creates a Non-Discretionary Duty 
 
The court began its analysis of the statutory duty by examining 
the statute itself.23 Using the canons of statutory interpretation, the court 
interpreted the provision’s use of the word “shall” to impose a statutory 
mandate.24 Citing case law, the court explained, “[t]he word ‘shall’ does 
not convey discretion. It is not a leeway word, but a word of 
command.”25 The court also examined the legislative history of § 321(a) 
for further support.26 The court referenced the House Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce Committee report which stated that under § 321(a) 
the EPA is “mandated” to evaluate employment loss.27 
 Upon concluding the plain text and legislative history of § 321(a) 
support a non-discretionary reading of the statute, the court addressed the 
EPA’s argument that the provision is discretionary because it does not 
include an “date-certain deadline.”28 The court found the provision 
promulgates a “continuing” timing requirement, which constitutes an 
“express unambiguous requirement on the agency of a continuing 
nature.”29 Further, the court relied on case law to show the absence of a 
bright line rule that only duties with date-certain deadlines are non-
discretionary.30 Conceding the EPA may have discretion regarding the 
timing of its evaluations, the court declined to accept that the EPA has 
the discretion to decline to conduct any evaluations at all.31 The court 
reasoned the EPA cannot ignore required procedures placed on it by the 
                                                     
21.  Id. at *9.  
22.  Id. at *12, *25, *47.  
23.  Id. at *18.  
24.  Id. at *18, *19 (citing Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 153 
(2001)).  
25.  Id. at *21 (quoting United States v. Fleet, 498 F.3d 1225, 1229 
(11th Cir. 2007)).   
26.  Id. at *21.  
27.  Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 317 (1977)).  
28.  Id. at *21. 
29.  Id. at *22.  
30. Id. at *24 (citing Sierra Club v. Johnson, No. C 08-01409, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68436, 2009 WL 2413092, *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2009)).  
31.  Id. at *24.  
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statute and § 321(a)’s purpose is to place a non-discretionary duty on the 
EPA.32 
  
B. Murray had Article III Standing to Maintain This Action 
 
Article III standing is a jurisdictional requirement ensuring that a 
court may hear a case or controversy.33 Standing consists of injury-in-
fact, causation, and redressability.34 A party seeking injunctive relief 
must show the injury-in-fact is concrete and particularized, actual and 
imminent, and not conjectural or hypothetical.35 Further, the injury must 
be fairly traceable to the party’s conduct and likely redressable upon a 
favorable judicial decision.36  
The court applied Article III standing principles to Murray and 
reasserted its previous finding that Murray had standing to maintain its 
action.37 In an action where the plaintiff is not the object of the 
challenged conduct, standing is “substantially more difficult to 
establish.”38 Upon recognizing a higher threshold applied in this case, the 
court addressed the EPA’s arguments.39 
The EPA argued that Murray made an insufficient showing of its 
alleged concrete economic injury by relying on an ambiguous reduction 
in the coal market.40 The court disagreed, finding that any lack of 
evidentiary support rested on the EPA’s failure to conduct evaluations as 
required by § 321(a).41 The court further reasoned that the lack of 
evidence carried less weight in assessing concreteness than Murray’s 
high personal stake in outcome.42 The court concluded that Murray’s 
high personal stake and the ability of economic injury to serve as an 
injury-in-fact combined to provide Murray with sufficient showing of a 
concrete and particularized injury-in-fact.43 
The court then evaluated the causation element of standing and 
ultimately rejected the EPA’s arguments asserting Murray failed to show 
causation.44 The court found Murray’s allegation that the EPA had a 
                                                     
32.  Id. at *25.  
33.  Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 
(1992)). 
34.  Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 
(1992)).  
35.  Id. at *27 (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 
493 (2009)).   
36.  Id. at *27 (quoting Summers, 555 U.S. at 493).   
37. Id. at *29. 
38.  Id. at *29, *30 (quoting Summers, 555 U.S. at 493-94).  
39.  Id. at *30.  
40.  Id.  
41.  Id.  
42.  Id. (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).  
43.  Id. at *31 (citing White Oak Realty, LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123227, 2014 WL 4387317 (E.D. La. Sept. 4, 
2014)).  
44.  Id. at *32, *38.  
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coercive effect on the energy industry sufficiently showed Murray’s 
injuries were fairly traceable to the EPA’s actions.45 The EPA argued 
that only its previous actions would be fairly traceable to Murray’s 
injuries.46 The court rejected this argument and reasoned that Murray’s 
injuries may also be fairly traceable to the EPA’s failure to conduct § 
321(a) evaluations.47 
The EPA also argued that Murray failed to quantify its economic 
losses resulting from a reduced coal market.48 The court refused to accept 
this argument. The court concluded that Murray was not required to 
quantify an economic injury to establish standing.49 The court relied on 
one of Murray’s experts to substantiate its rationale that Murray would 
likely suffer economic injury as a result of current Act’s regulations and 
future EPA actions, including the Clean Power Plan.50 The court also 
rejected the EPA’s argument that because Murray is a larger corporation 
today than it was in 2009, it would not be injured by a depressed coal 
market; “EPA does not need to kill a company to injure it.”51  
Lastly, the court addressed redressability and found that 
Murray’s injuries would likely be redressed upon a favorable judgment.52 
The court reasoned that if it granted Murray injunctive relief, the EPA’s 
evaluation results may convince the EPA, Congress, or the public to 
amend the EPA’s prior actions.53 The court hypothesized that if the EPA 
refused to alter its actions after completing evaluation measures, the 
evaluation itself would lead to heightened congressional oversight of the 
EPA actions.54 
 
C. The EPA Failed or Refused to Conduct Evaluations 
Required by Clean Air Act § 321 
 
Addressing the EPA’s third assertion for summary judgment, the 
court evaluated the EPA’s arguments, considered its actions, and found 
that the EPA was not in compliance with the requirements of § 321(a).55 
The EPA’s chiefly argued it had completed some evaluations that should 
satisfy § 321’s requirements.56 However, the court found the identified 
evaluations were not conducted under the statute and the EPA’s 
                                                     
45.  Id. at *34.  
46.  Id.  
47.  Id.  
48.  Id. at *35, *36.  
49.  Id. at *36 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
578 (1992)).  
50.  Id. at *36, *37 (internal citation omitted).  
51.  Id. at *37; see also Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 396 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014).  
52. Murray Energy Corp., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143404, 2015 WL 
7017009 at *39.  
53.  Id.  
54.  Id.  
55.  Id. at *73  
56.  Id. at *47.  
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argument contradicts the statute’s legislative history and the agency’s 
own actions.57 
 First, the court evaluated the legislative intent of § 321(a) and 
found that Congress “unmistakably intended” to conduct evaluations of 
the Act’s effects on employment in order to address and improve issues 
with job loss and plant closures.58 The court cited various hearings and 
proposals exhibiting Congress’s concern with economic depression 
resulting from environmental regulations.59 Interestingly, when Congress 
added § 321(a) to the Act amendments in 1977,60 the EPA had already 
taken action to evaluate employment loss through a program called 
Economic Dislocation Early Warning System (“EDEWS”).61  
EDEWS was a system designed to track employment loss and 
complete economic analysis aimed at identifying other potential losses 
resulting from regulation.62 During the first ten years of implementing 
EDEWS, the EPA identified disruption and closures in 155 plants as a 
result of regulation.63 However, the EPA discontinued the EDEWS 
program for unknown reasons and in Murray argued § 321 had not been 
interpreted to require the EPA to conduct employment evaluations.64 The 
EPA’s previous actions through EDEWS directly contradict the agency’s 
interpretation.65  
 The record repeatedly set forth the EPA’s argument that it had 
not interpreted § 321 as requiring the agency to conduct employment 
evaluations and that any employment investigations it conducted would 
have limited utility.66 However, in the EPA’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment it requested that the court recognize 64 documents as 
satisfying compliance with § 321(a).67 The court found the EPA failed to 
explain this contradiction and none of the 64 documents mention § 
321(a) or present a continuing evaluation of employment loss and plant 
closures.68 The Court found the EPA’s attempt to establish compliance 
with § 321(a) insufficient and reasserted its holding that the EPA was not 
in compliance with the provision’s requirements.69 
 
 
 
                                                     
57.  Id. at *48, *58, *65.  
58.  Id. at *48, *49 (citing H.R. REP. 95-294, at 316 (1977)).  
59.  Id. at *50–*56.  
60.  Id. at *55.  
61.  Id. at *56.  
62.  Id.  
63.  Id. at *58.  
64. Id.  
65. Id. at *58–*59.  
66.  Id. at *58–*61 (citing EPA Administrator McCarthy’s response to 
various requests for the EPA’s continuing evaluations of employment loss due to 
environmental rulemakings).   
67.  Id. at *65.  
68.  Id. at *66, *71.  
69.  Id. at *73.  
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IV. CONCLUSION & IMPLICATIONS 
 
Defeating each of the EPA’s arguments, the court granted 
Summary Judgment in favor of Murray.70 The court reasoned that the 
importance, effects, and claims of the coal industry require the EPA to 
conduct evaluations on the effects environmental regulations impose on 
the industry, and the EPA’s refusal to do so would be an abuse of 
discretion.71 This decision reflects issues surrounding the ongoing Clean 
Power Plan litigation and the opposition of many coal producing states 
regarding environmental regulation and the economic burden it imposes 
on the energy sector. This claim can largely be viewed as an attempt to 
limit the looming effects the Clean Power Plan imposes on the coal 
industry. Notwithstanding the Clean Power Plan, due to recent political 
developments coal companies may abandon this litigation although they 
have established economic injury sufficient to force the EPA to wholly 
adhere to the Clean Air Act.  
 
 
 
                                                     
70.  Id. at *83.  
71.  Id. at *83.  
